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Introduction 
Governments have been intervening to boost 
an underperforming Welsh economy since 
1934. Regional policies encouraged 
manufacturing industries to locate factories in 
Wales after the Second World War but these 
policies lost effectiveness in the 1970s 
(Gooberman and Curtis, 2020). The decline of 
regional policies coincided with the 
government’s 1976 creation of the Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA). The Agency 
had a central role in economic development 
until it merged with the Welsh Government in 
2006. This article provides a brief overview of 
recent research (e.g. Gooberman, 2017; 
Gooberman and Boyns, 2020) to explore the 
WDA’s achievements and their contemporary 
implications. 
The WDA was funded by the Welsh Office 
before 1999 and then by the National 
Assembly for Wales/Welsh Assembly 
Government. It also raised income from 
property. The Agency was autonomous with 
its own board as it was obliged to work closely 
with industry, using skills different to those 
generally found in the civil service. Agency 
activities can be divided into: property; foreign 
direct investment (FDI); land reclamation; 
business support, and; venture capital. The 
remainder of this paper will explore each of the 
roles in turn, before turning to contemporary 
implications. 
Property 
The WDA inherited the government’s portfolio 
of industrial sites and premises. Throughout 
the late 1970s and the deep recession of the  
 
early 1980s, the agency built hundreds of 
advance factories and marketed them to 
investors. The portfolio was successful and 
almost 50,000 people worked in Agency 
owned factories by the end of the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, two trends impacted property 
activities by the 1990s. One was that 
manufacturing focused increasingly on 
technology, not assembly. The Agency 
responded with plans for high-specification 
developments but few were constructed. The 
other trend was the economic shift from 
manufacturing towards services. Fewer 
investors were willing to locate factories in 
Wales, but the Agency infrequently developed 
properties or sites suitable for service sector 
activities. WDA activity decreased even 
before John Redwood, the non-interventionist 
Secretary of State for Wales from 1993, 
ordered the Agency to sell its portfolio 
(Gooberman, 2019). 
Property was a low priority after devolution but 
one high profile project was Technium 
facilities. These housed and supported high 
technology companies but were built without 
adequate assessments of market potential. 
They created few jobs and the programme 
was ultimately cancelled in 2010 (Pugh et. al., 
2018). The Agency also prepared a strategy 
to fill gaps in the types of sites and properties 
offered to investors, but this was side-lined 
during the merger with the Welsh Assembly 
Government. 
The WDA’s activities were effective when the 
construction of factories and their subsequent 




occupation enabled jobs to be created quickly 
at a time of great need. However, the Agency 
struggled when manufacturing declined, and 
was discredited by the Technium programme. 
Overall, the WDA’s early interventions were 
successful, but the impact of subsequent ones 
declined as markets changed. 
FDI 
The WDA initially part-funded the 
Development Corporation for Wales, a semi-
state FDI marketing organisation. The 
corporation merged with the WDA in 1983 to 
manage overseas offices marketing Wales to 
investors. The Agency focused on 
manufacturing as these companies wanted 
locations with attributes offered by Wales: 
access to European markets; low cost labour; 
availability of sites and factories; good road 
and rail communications; and, grants 
(Gooberman, 2017). In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Wales captured up to a fifth of UK 
FDI projects including those from Sony, 
Hitachi, Panasonic and Toyota. 
Despite success, FDI was critiqued. Criticisms 
included the few jobs created compared to 
those lost through deindustrialisation, 
investments were often assembly-type 
operations employing few high skilled 
workers, and the unreliability of performance 
data. Crucially, Wales’ FDI performance 
declined from the mid-1990s. Decline was 
driven by the loss of competitive advantage in 
manufacturing FDI to low-tax locations in 
Ireland and low-wage locations in Eastern 
Europe after EU enlargement. Concurrently, 
FDI was increasingly likely to be in service 
activities which Wales had long struggled to 
attract. 
The downturn of manufacturing FDI coincided 
with its symbolic peak in 1996: the LG project 
from South Korea that planned to create 6,000 
jobs in Newport. LG received large grants but 
the project failed and much of the grant was 
lost, discrediting FDI orientated policy 
(Gooberman, 2018). 
Nevertheless, FDI was often beneficial and 
many factories created significant impacts, 
some of which endured for many years. 
Foreign firms in Wales tended to be larger, 
more productive and higher paying than 
domestic firms (Munday, 2000). The position 
of Wales as a leading FDI location was a 
significant achievement that was greatly 
assisted by the WDA. However, 
manufacturing FDI was vulnerable to external 
influences and could form only one element of 
a regenerating economy, but success 
prompted the Agency to over-prioritise this 
type of inward investment. 
Land Reclamation 
The volume of historic resource extraction and 
heavy industry left thousands of derelict sites 
throughout Wales. These included spoil heaps 
from mining slate, copper and coal, as well as 
former factories and military bases. 
The Agency managed an ambitious 
reclamation programme. When assessing 
sites, the legacy of the Aberfan disaster 
prompted the WDA to prioritise those that 
were unsafe. The Agency then prioritised 
those with potential for factories or housing, 
followed by sites with potential for leisure 
usage or environmental enhancement.  
The WDA reclaimed 8,300 hectares across 
hundreds of sites from 1978-79 to 2005-06. In 
north Wales, the Agency cleared workings 
including those related to the extraction of 
slate, lead, silver and copper. In south-west 
Wales, the WDA cleared sites including 
former military installations, while dramatic 
transformations in the south Wales valleys 
included the removal of a 120-metre-high spoil 
tip at Bargoed (Gooberman, 2015). By the 
early 1990s, the amount of land cleared 
enabled activity to increasingly focus on urban 
regeneration that combined clearance with 
housing, retail, infrastructure and leisure 
facilities.  
Reclamation dramatically improved 
landscapes throughout Wales, although many 
sloping and isolated sites were unsuitable for 
employment uses. Urban programmes 
improved townscapes although physical 
regeneration was no panacea for structural 
problems. Finally, the removal of dereliction 
led to an external reassessment of Wales’ 




qualities as an investment and tourist 
destination (Gooberman and Boyns, 2020). 
Business support 
In the late 1970s a few advisors from the 
Agency’s Small Business Advisory Unit visited 
companies to advise on topics including 
advertising and exporting. The annual number 
of advisory visits and interviews, however, 
then grew to over thirteen thousand by 1989-
90. The WDA also prioritised high technology 
businesses from 1984 through its Wales 
Investment and Technology (WINtech) 
division, but struggled to achieve impact 
(Henderson, 2018). 
By 1991-92 WINTech had merged with the 
Agency’s largest department, the Business 
Support Division. More resources drove 
greater activity across a complex mix of 
technology, supplier development, and skills 
development (Morgan and Henderson, 1997). 
Evaluation was often lacking. The Agency 
also launched a rural programme in the early 
1990s that created local development 
agencies.  
The WDA co-ordinated some business 
support activities from the mid-1990s, notably 
through a Regional Technology Plan that drew 
on the views of 600 organisations. The 
Agency overhauled general advisory support 
and the ‘Business Eye’ service responded to 
25,000 enquiries in 2005-06. Finally, a greater 
focus on entrepreneurship appeared, 
particularly through the Entrepreneurship 
Action Plan.  
Business support gradually moved from the 
margins to become the Agency’s central 
activity. While there was much activity and 
some positive outputs, the intangible nature of 
many of the former combines with the lack of 
data to preclude an overall assessment of 
effectiveness. 
Venture Capital 
Between 1976 and 1994 the WDA made over 
two thousand loan and equity investments 
(Gooberman and Boyns, 2019). The Agency 
argued that commercial providers neglected 
viable projects, while its investments would 
create spillover benefits such as jobs.  
The WDA initially supported businesses of all 
sizes but losses led to reduced activity after 
1979. However, economic turbulence then 
prompted more investment in small firms and 
start-ups. Investments included large sums in 
Parrot, a computer disc manufacturer. The 
WDA also created new funds including the 
Welsh Venture Capital Fund, and underwrote 
share issues.  
The annual number of investments peaked in 
1989-90, but the Agency was discredited by 
poor financial performance throughout most of 
the 1980s, the 1989 failure of Parrot, the 
closure of the loss-making Welsh Venture 
Capital Fund, and underwriting losses.  
By 1990 the WDA accepted that it was 
‘difficult, if not impossible’ to make a positive 
return from start-up or early stage businesses. 
Investment declined and focused on low risk 
projects. Expectations remained unfulfilled 
and in 1994 John Redwood ordered the WDA 
to largely withdraw from investment 
(Gooberman, 2019).  
Nevertheless, devolution led to policy reversal 
and a new body, Finance Wales, was 
established as an Agency subsidiary in 2001. 
By 2005-06 Finance Wales had invested in 
over 90 companies and although it was 
recording successes, overall performance 
was unclear. 
The scope of WDA activity and the failure to 
build a profitable portfolio by 1994 implies that 
viable projects overlooked by commercial 
providers did not exist in volume. The problem 
was that the Agency’s objectives of 
assembling a profitable portfolio and raising 
commercial activity were incompatible in a 
poorly performing economy. However, while 
spillover data are limited, it is likely that 
investment helped to create much-needed 
benefits in a deindustrialising economy 
lacking many attributes necessary for self-
sustaining regeneration (Gooberman and 
Boyns, 2019). 
 




Findings and observations 
It is difficult to quantify and assess the totality 
of Agency activity (Gooberman and Boyns, 
2020). Consistent time-series data for all 
activity do not exist and cannot be 
reassembled. Where data exist, many 
approaches to double-counting, additionality 
and displacement reduce their credibility. For 
example, the WDA did not publish the number 
of jobs claimed as created or safeguarded by 
all Agency activities until 1995-96. These 
figures grew from 15,230 in 1995-96 to peak 
at a barely credible 52,900 in 2003-04. 
Nevertheless, intervention was most effective 
where Wales had a competitive advantage. 
When the country offered manufacturers low-
cost access to European markets, the Agency 
could exploit this through expertly providing 
sites, factories and access to Welsh Office 
grants to attract investment that filled factories 
and created thousands of jobs. While land 
reclamation was often separate from other 
activities, its impact was dramatic. Overall, it is 
likely that the economy would have been in a 
significantly worse state without these Agency 
interventions. 
Conversely, the WDA struggled in areas 
where Wales had long exhibited weaknesses 
including developing indigenous businesses 
and higher-value service sector activities. Its 
venture capital portfolio performed poorly in 
financial terms while business support often 
strained to achieve measurable impact. 
Successful interventions in manufacturing 
obscured the lack of impact elsewhere, but the 
WDA struggled once the focus of intervention 
shifted to services. While difficulty was 
generally attributable to structural problems 
outside the Agency’s reach, it could have 
made greater efforts to adapt its activities.  
Political devolution created new pressures. 
The new institution was determined to solve 
economic underperformance and, boosted by 
European structural funds, dramatically 
increased resources for economic 
development. However, strategies and 
programmes were too numerous, over-
optimistic and poorly governed, producing 
disappointing results despite greater funding. 
The WDA became bloated and unfocused, 
contributing to political disappointment and its 
dissolution in 2006 (Gooberman, 2017). 
The Welsh Government now discharges many 
of the Agency’s former responsibilities, but it 
faces similar structural problems, and, despite 
some successes, the Welsh economy by 2018 
was ‘exactly where it was in 1998 in relative 
performance terms’ (Bristow, 2018).  
There are two final observations. The first is 
on governance. The establishment of the 
Agency as an arms-length body to support 
more effective interactions with businesses 
was vindicated. Such bodies can bridge 
cultural differences between the public and 
private sectors to deliver tailored services 
effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, the 
WDA suffered governance failures in the early 
1990s, highlighting how arms-length bodies 
need rigorous internal governance and 
effective external scrutiny.  
The other observation is that the WDA 
highlighted the increasingly obvious difficulties 
of intervening successfully in an 
underperforming ‘regional’ economy 
dominated by services. The Agency built its 
reputation through intervening in 
manufacturing, but economic change 
prompted a greater emphasis on services 
through an over-complex variety of projects, 
programmes and funding streams. Although 
the WDA declared after the millennium that it 
was creating and safeguarding many 
thousands of jobs, observers struggled to 
detect improvements to the country’s 
economic trajectory.  
To conclude, the Agency’s history suggests 
that economic development activities can be 
worthwhile but will struggle to deliver their 
broader objectives within the contemporary 
economy of Wales. The question of what 
could best deliver these objectives has yet to 
be conclusively answered.  
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